INTRODUCTION
respect to assisting in the understanding of how and why certain firms build competitive advantage in regimes of rapid change. Our approach is The fundamental question in the field of strategic management is how firms achieve and sustain especially relevant in a Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition, price/performance competitive advantage. 1 We confront this question here by developing the dynamic capabilities rivalry, increasing returns, and the 'creative destruction' of existing competences. The approach, which endeavors to analyze the sources of wealth creation and capture by firms. The approach endeavors to explain firm-level success and failure. We are interested in both building a development of this framework flows from a recognition by the authors that strategic theory is better theory of firm performance, as well as informing managerial practice. replete with analyses of firm-level strategies for sustaining and safeguarding extant competitive
In order to position our analysis in a manner that displays similarities and differences with advantage, but has performed less well with existing approaches, we begin by briefly reviewing accepted frameworks for strategic manKey words: competences; capabilities; innovation; agement. We endeavor to expose implicit assumpstrategy; path dependency; knowledge assets tions, and identify competitive circumstances *Correspondence to: David J. Teece, Institute of Management, where each paradigm might display some relative Innovation and Organization, Haas School of Business, Uni-advantage as both a useful descriptive and normaversity of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1930, U.S.A. tive theory of competitive strategy. While numer-two decades about the sources of competitive recognizes but does not attempt to explain the nature of the isolating mechanisms that enable advantage, many cluster around just a few loosely structured frameworks or paradigms. In this paper entrepreneurial rents and competitive advantage to be sustained. we attempt to identify three existing paradigms and describe aspects of an emerging new paraAnother component of the efficiency-based approach is developed in this paper. Rudimentary digm that we label dynamic capabilities.
The dominant paradigm in the field during efforts are made to identify the dimensions of firm-specific capabilities that can be sources of the 1980s was the competitive forces approach developed by Porter (1980) . This approach, advantage, and to explain how combinations of competences and resources can be developed, rooted in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organization (Mason, 1949 ; deployed, and protected. We refer to this as the 'dynamic capabilities' approach in order to stress Bain, 1959) , emphasizes the actions a firm can take to create defensible positions against com-exploiting existing internal and external firmspecific competences to address changing petitive forces. A second approach, referred to as a strategic conflict approach (e.g., Shapiro, 1989) , environments. Elements of the approach can be found in Schumpeter (1942) , Penrose (1959) , is closely related to the first in its focus on product market imperfections, entry deterrence, Nelson and Winter (1982) , Prahalad and Hamel (1990) , Teece (1976 Teece ( , 1986a Teece ( , 1986b Teece ( , 1988 and and strategic interaction. The strategic conflict approach uses the tools of game theory and thus in Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark (1988) :
Because this approach emphasizes the developimplicitly views competitive outcomes as a function of the effectiveness with which firms keep ment of management capabilities, and difficultto-imitate combinations of organizational, functheir rivals off balance through strategic investments, pricing strategies, signaling, and the con-tional and technological skills, it integrates and draws upon research in such areas as the managetrol of information. Both the competitive forces and the strategic conflict approaches appear to ment of R&D, product and process development, technology transfer, intellectual property, manushare the view that rents flow from privileged product market positions.
facturing, human resources, and organizational learning. Because these fields are often viewed Another distinct class of approaches emphasizes building competitive advantage through cap-as outside the traditional boundaries of strategy, much of this research has not been incorporated turing entrepreneurial rents stemming from fundamental firm-level efficiency advantages. These into existing economic approaches to strategy issues. As a result, dynamic capabilities can be approaches have their roots in a much older discussion of corporate strengths and weaknesses; seen as an emerging and potentially integrative approach to understanding the newer sources of they have taken on new life as evidence suggests that firms build enduring advantages only through competitive advantage.
We suggest that the dynamic capabilities efficiency and effectiveness, and as developments in organizational economics and the study of approach is promising both in terms of future research potential and as an aid to management technological and organizational change become applied to strategy questions. One strand of this endeavoring to gain competitive advantage in increasingly demanding environments. To illusliterature, often referred to as the 'resource-based perspective,' emphasizes firm-specific capabilities trate the essential elements of the dynamic capabilities approach, the sections that follow compare and assets and the existence of isolating mechanisms as the fundamental determinants of firm and contrast this approach to other models of strategy. Each section highlights the strategic performance (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) .
2 This perspective how. Over time, these assets may expand beyond the point of profitable reinvestment in a firm's traditional market. 2 Of these authors, Rumelt may have been the first to selfconsciously apply a resource perspective to the field of strat-Accordingly, the firm may consider deploying its intangible assets in different product or geographical markets, where the egy. Rumelt (1984: 561) notes that the strategic firm 'is characterized by a bundle of linked and idiosyncratic resources expected returns are higher, if efficient transfer modes exist. ' Wernerfelt (1984) was early to recognize that this approach and resource conversion activities.' Similarly, Teece (1984: 95) notes: 'Successful firms possess one or more forms of was at odds with product market approaches and might constitute a distinct paradigm of strategy. intangible assets, such as technological or managerial know-insights provided by each approach as well as (1980) . Competitive strategies are often aimed at altering the firm's position in the industry vis-à -the different competitive circumstances in which it might be most appropriate. Needless to say, vis competitors and suppliers. Industry structure plays a central role in determining and limiting these approaches are in many ways complementary and a full understanding of firm-level, com-strategic action.
Some industries or subsectors of industries petitive advantage requires an appreciation of all four approaches and more.
become more 'attractive' because they have structural impediments to competitive forces (e.g., entry barriers) that allow firms better opportunities for creating sustainable competitive
MODELS OF STRATEGY EMPHASIZING THE EXPLOITATION
advantages. Rents are created largely at the industry or subsector level rather than at the firm level.
OF MARKET POWER
While there is some recognition given to firmCompetitive forces specific assets, differences among firms relate primarily to scale. This approach to strategy The dominant paradigm in strategy at least during the 1980s was the competitive forces approach. reflects its incubation inside the field of industrial organization and in particular the industrial strucPioneered by Porter (1980) , the competitive forces approach views the essence of competitive ture school of Mason and Bain 3 . strategy formulation as 'relating a company to its environment . . . [T] he key aspect of the firm's Strategic conflict environment is the industry or industries in which it competes.' Industry structure strongly influ-The publication of Carl Shapiro's 1989 article, confidently titled ' The Theory of Business ences the competitive rules of the game as well as the strategies potentially available to firms.
Strategy,' announced the emergence of a new approach to business strategy, if not strategic In the competitive forces model, five industrylevel forces-entry barriers, threat of substitution, management. This approach utilizes the tools of game theory to analyze the nature of competitive bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry among industry interaction between rival firms. The main thrust of work in this tradition is to reveal how a firm incumbents-determine the inherent profit potential of an industry or subsegment of an industry. can influence the behavior and actions of rival firms and thus the market environment.
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The approach can be used to help the firm find a position in an industry from which it can Examples of such moves are investment in capacity (Dixit, 1980) , R&D (Gilbert and Newbest defend itself against competitive forces or influence them in its favor (Porter, 1980 (Porter, : 4). berry, 1982 , and advertising (Schmalensee, 1983) . To be effective, these strategic moves This 'five-forces' framework provides a systematic way of thinking about how competitive require irreversible commitments. 5 The moves in question will have no effect if they can be forces work at the industry level and how these forces determine the profitability of different costlessly undone. A key idea is that by manipulating the market environment, a firm may be industries and industry segments. The competitive forces framework also contains a number of able to increase its profits. underlying assumptions about the sources of competition and the nature of the strategy process. 3 In competitive environments characterized by sustainable and stable mobility and structural barriers, these forces may To facilitate comparisons with other approaches, become the determinants of industry-level profitability. Howwe highlight several distinctive characteristics of ever, competitive advantage is more complex to ascertain in the framework.
environments of rapid technological change where specific assets owned by heterogeneous firms can be expected to play Economic rents in the competitive forces a larger role in explaining rents. framework are monopoly rents . 4 The market environment is all factors that influence market Firms in an industry earn rents when they are outcomes (prices, quantities, profits) including the beliefs of customers and of rivals, the number of potential technologies somehow able to impede the competitive forces employed, and the costs or speed with which a rival can (in either factor markets or product markets) enter the industry. which tend to drive economic returns to zero. 5 For an excellent discussion of committed competition in multiple contexts, see Ghemawat (1991) .
Available strategies are described in Porter
This literature, together with the contestability which the strategic conflict literature is relevant to strategic management. Firms that have a literature (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982) , has led to a greater appreciation of the role of sunk tremendous cost or other competitive advantage vis-à -vis their rivals ought not be transfixed by costs, as opposed to fixed costs, in determining competitive outcomes. Strategic moves can also the moves and countermoves of their rivals. Their competitive fortunes will swing more on total be designed to influence rivals' behavior through signaling. Strategic signaling has been examined demand conditions, not on how competitors deploy and redeploy their competitive assets. Put in a number of contexts, including predatory pricing (Kreps and Wilson, 1982a, 1982b) and differently, when there are gross asymmetries in competitive advantage between firms, the results limit pricing Roberts, 1982a, 1982b) . More recent treatments have emphasized of game-theoretic analysis are likely to be obvious and uninteresting. The stronger competitor will the role of commitment and reputation (e.g., Ghemawat, 1991) and the benefits of firms simul-generally advance, even if disadvantaged by certain information asymmetries. To be sure, incumtaneously pursuing competition and cooperation 6 (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995, 1996) . bent firms can be undone by new entrants with a dramatic cost advantage, but no 'gaming' will In many instances, game theory formalizes long-standing intuitive arguments about various overturn that outcome. On the other hand, if firms' competitive positions are more delicately types of business behavior (e.g., predatory pricing, patent races), though in some instances it has balanced, as with Coke and Pepsi, and United Airlines and American Airlines, then strategic induced a substantial change in the conventional wisdom. But by rationalizing observed behavior conflict is of interest to competitive outcomes.
Needless to say, there are many such circumby reference to suitably designed games, in explaining everything these models also explain stances, but they are rare in industries where there is rapid technological change and fast-shiftnothing, as they do not generate testable predictions (Sutton, 1992) . Many specific game-ing market circumstances.
In short, where competitors do not have deeptheoretic models admit multiple equilibrium, and a wide range of choice exists as to the design of seated competitive advantages, the moves and countermoves of competitors can often be usethe appropriate game form to be used. Unfortunately, the results often depend on the precise fully formulated in game-theoretic terms. However, we doubt that game theory can comprehenspecification chosen. The equilibrium in models of strategic behavior crucially depends on what sively illuminate how Chrysler should compete against Toyota and Honda, or how United Airone rival believes another rival will do in a particular situation. Thus the qualitative features lines can best respond to Southwest Airlines since Southwest's advantage is built on organizational of the results may depend on the way price competition is modeled (e.g., Bertrand or attributes which United cannot readily replicate. 8 Indeed, the entrepreneurial side of strategy-how Cournot) or on the presence or absence of strategic asymmetries such as first-mover advantages. significant new rent streams are created and protected-is largely ignored by the gameThe analysis of strategic moves using game theory can be thought of as 'dynamic' in the theoretic approach.
9 Accordingly, we find that the approach, while important, is most relevant sense that multiperiod analyses can be pursued both intuitively and formally. However, we use the term 'dynamic' in this paper in a different sense, referring to situations where there is rapid 8 Thus even in the air transport industry game-theoretic formuchange in technology and market forces, and lations by no means capture all the relevant dimensions of 'feedback' effects on firms. 7 competitive rivalry. United Airlines' and United Express's difficulties in competing with Southwest Airlines because of
We have a particular view of the contexts in United's inability to fully replicate Southwest's operation capabilities is documented in Gittel (1995) . 9 Important exceptions can be found in Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) such as their emphasis on the role of com-6 Competition and cooperation have also been analyzed ouside of this tradition. See, for example, Teece (1992) and Link, plements. However, these insights do not flow uniquely from game theory and can be found in the organizational economics Teece and Finan (1996) . 7 Accordingly, both approaches are dynamic, but in very literature (e.g., Teece, 1986a Teece, , 1986b de Figueiredo and Teece, 1996) . different senses.
when competitors are closely matched 10 and the that may deter entry and raise prices above longrun costs, but because they have markedly lower population of relevant competitors and the identity of their strategic alternatives can be readily costs, or offer markedly higher quality or product performance. This approach focuses on the rents ascertained. Nevertheless, coupled with other approaches it can sometimes yield powerful accruing to the owners of scarce firm-specific resources rather than the economic profits from insights.
However, this research has an orientation that product market positioning. 12 Competitive advantage lies 'upstream' of product markets and rests we are concerned about in terms of the implicit framing of strategic issues. Rents, from a game-on the firm's idiosyncratic and difficult-toimitate resources.
13 theoretic perspective, are ultimately a result of managers' intellectual ability to 'play the game.' One can find the resources approach suggested by the earlier preanalytic strategy literature. A The adage of the strategist steeped in this approach is 'do unto others before they do unto leading text of the 1960s (Learned et al., 1969) noted that 'the capability of an organization is its you.' We worry that fascination with strategic moves and Machiavellian tricks will distract man-demonstrated and potential ability to accomplish against the opposition of circumstance or compeagers from seeking to build more enduring sources of competitive advantage. The approach tition, whatever it sets out to do. Every organization has actual and potential strengths and weakunfortunately ignores competition as a process involving the development, accumulation, combi-nesses; it is important to try to determine what they are and to distinguish one from the other.' nation, and protection of unique skills and capabilities. Since strategic interactions are what Thus what a firm can do is not just a function of the opportunities it confronts; it also depends receive focal attention, the impression one might receive from this literature is that success in the on what resources the organization can muster.
Learned et al. proposed that the real key to a marketplace is the result of sophisticated plays and counterplays, when this is generally not the company's success or even to its future development lies in its ability to find or create 'a comcase at all.
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In what follows, we suggest that building a petence that is truly distinctive.' 14 This literature also recognized the constraints on firm behavior dynamic view of the business enterprisesomething missing from the two approaches we and, in particular, noted that one should not assume that management 'can rise to any have so far identified-enhances the probability of establishing an acceptable descriptive theory occasion.' These insights do appear to keenly anticipate the resource-based approach that has of strategy that can assist practitioners in the building of long-run advantage and competitive since emerged, but they did not provide a theory or systematic framework for analyzing business flexibility. Below, we discuss first the resourcebased perspective and then an extension we call strategies. Indeed, Andrews (1987: 46) noted that
'much of what is intuitive in this process is the dynamic capabilities approach.
yet to be identified.' Unfortunately, the academic literature on capabilities stalled for a couple of decades.
MODELS OF STRATEGY EMPHASIZING EFFICIENCY
New impetus has been given to the resourcebased approach by recent theoretical developResource-based perspective ments in organizational economics and in the theory of strategy, as well as by a growing The resource-based approach sees firms with superior systems and structures being profitable not because they engage in strategic investments 12 In the language of economics, rents flow from unique firmspecific assets that cannot readily be replicated, rather than from tactics which deter entry and keep competitors off 10 When closely matched in an aggregate sense, they may nevertheless display asymmetries which game theorists can balance. In short, rents are Ricardian.
13 Teece (1982: 46) saw the firm as having 'a variety of end analyze. 11 The strategic conflict literature also tends to focus prac-products which it can produce with its organizational technology.' titioners on product market positioning rather than on developing the unique assets which make possible superior 14 Elsewhere Andrews (1987: 47) defined a distinctive competence as what an organization can do particularly well. product market positions (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . body of anecdotal and empirical literature 15 that process. 18 Quite simply, firms lack the organizational capacity to develop new competences highlights the importance of firm-specific factors in explaining firm performance. Cool and Schen-quickly (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . Secondly, some assets are simply not readily tradeable, for del (1988) have shown that there are systematic and significant performance differences among example, tacit know-how (Teece, 1976 (Teece, , 1980 and reputation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . Thus, firms which belong to the same strategic group within the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Rumelt resource endowments cannot equilibrate through factor input markets. Finally, even when an asset (1991) has shown that intraindustry differences in profits are greater than interindustry differences can be purchased, firms may stand to gain little by doing so. As Barney (1986) points out, unless a in profits, strongly suggesting the importance of firm-specific factors and the relative unimportance firm is lucky, possesses superior information, or both, the price it pays in a competitive factor of industry effects.
16 Jacobsen (1988) and Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) made similar findings. market will fully capitalize the rents from the asset. Given that in the resources perspective firms A comparison of the resource-based approach and the competitive forces approach (discussed possess heterogeneous and sticky resource bundles, the entry decision process suggested by earlier in the paper) in terms of their implications for the strategy process is revealing. From the this approach is as follows: (1) identify your firm's unique resources; (2) decide in which marfirst perspective, an entry decision looks roughly as follows: (1) pick an industry (based on its kets those resources can earn the highest rents;
and (3) decide whether the rents from those assets 'structural attractiveness'); (2) choose an entry strategy based on conjectures about competitors' are most effectively utilized by (a) integrating into related market(s), (b) selling the relevant rational strategies; (3) if not already possessed, acquire or otherwise obtain the requisite assets to intermediate output to related firms, or (c) selling the assets themselves to a firm in related busicompete in the market. From this perspective, the process of identifying and developing the requi-nesses (Teece, 1980 (Teece, , 1982 .
The resource-based perspective puts both vertisite assets is not particularly problematic. The process involves nothing more than choosing cal integration and diversification into a new strategic light. Both can be viewed as ways of capturrationally among a well-defined set of investment alternatives. If assets are not already owned, they ing rents on scarce, firm-specific assets whose services are difficult to sell in intermediate marcan be bought. The resource-based perspective is strongly at odds with this conceptualization.
kets (Penrose, 1959; Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1980 Teece, , 1982 Teece, , 1986a Teece, , 1986b Wernerfelt, 1984) . From the resource-based perspective, firms are heterogeneous with respect to their resources/ Empirical work on the relationship between performance and diversification by Wernerfelt and capabilities/endowments. Further, resource endowments are 'sticky:' at least in the short run, firms Montgomery (1988) provides evidence for this proposition. It is evident that the resource-based are to some degree stuck with what they have and may have to live with what they lack.
17 This perspective focuses on strategies for exploiting existing firm-specific assets. stickiness arises for three reasons. First, business development is viewed as an extremely complex However, the resource-based perspective also invites consideration of managerial strategies for developing new capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984) . 15 Studies of the automobile and other industries displayed Indeed, if control over scarce resources is the differences in organization which often underlay differences amongst firms. See, for example, Womack, Jones, and Roos, source of economic profits, then it follows that 1991; Hayes and Clark, 1985 ; Barney, Spender and Reve, such issues as skill acquisition, the management 1994; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Cockburn, of knowledge and know-how (Shuen, 1994), and Nelson, 1991; Levinthal and Myatt, 1994. 16 Using FTC line of business data, Rumelt showed that stable learning become fundamental strategic issues. It industry effects account for only 8 percent of the variance in is in this second dimension, encompassing skill business unit returns. Furthermore, only about 40 percent of acquisition, learning, and accumulation of organithe dispersion in industry returns is due to stable industry effects.
zational and intangible or 'invisible' assets (Itami 17 In this regard, this approach has much in common with recent work on organizational ecology (e.g., Freeman and Boeker, 1984) and also on commitment (Ghemawat, 1991: 17-25) .
18 Capability development, however, is not really analyzed. The notion that competitive advantage requires competitive advantage is achieved. Well-known companies like IBM, Texas Instruments, Philips, both the exploitation of existing internal and external firm-specific capabilities, and developing and others appear to have followed a 'resourcebased strategy' of accumulating valuable tech-new ones is partially developed in Penrose (1959) , Teece (1982) , and Wernerfelt (1984) . nology assets, often guarded by an aggressive intellectual property stance. However, this strat-However, only recently have researchers begun to focus on the specifics of how some organizaegy is often not enough to support a significant competitive advantage. Winners in the global tions first develop firm-specific capabilities and how they renew competences to respond to shifts marketplace have been firms that can demonstrate timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible prod-in the business environment.
20 These issues are intimately tied to the firm's business processes, uct innovation, coupled with the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy market positions, and expansion paths. Several writers have recently offered insights and eviinternal and external competences. Not surprisingly, industry observers have remarked that com-dence on how firms can develop their capability to adapt and even capitalize on rapidly changing panies can accumulate a large stock of valuable technology assets and still not have many use-environments.
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The dynamic capabilities approach seeks to provide a coherent framework ful capabilities.
We refer to this ability to achieve new forms which can both integrate existing conceptual and empirical knowledge, and facilitate prescription. of competitive advantage as 'dynamic capabilities' to emphasize two key aspects that were not In doing so, it builds upon the theoretical foundations provided by Schumpeter (1934) , Penrose the main focus of attention in previous strategy perspectives. The term 'dynamic' refers to the (1959), Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , Barney (1986) , Nelson and Winter (1982) , Teece (1988) , and capacity to renew competences so as to achieve congruence with the changing business environ- Teece et al. (1994) . ment; certain innovative responses are required when time-to-market and timing are critical, the rate of technological change is rapid, and the TOWARD A DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK nature of future competition and markets difficult to determine. The term 'capabilities' emphasizes Terminology the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring In order to facilitate theory development and intellectual dialogue, some acceptable definitions internal and external organizational skills, resources, and functional competences to match are desirable. We propose the following. the requirements of a changing environment.
One aspect of the strategic problem facing 19 Deciding, under significant uncertainty about future states an innovating firm in a world of Schumpeterian of the world, which long-term paths to commit to and when to change paths is the central strategic problem confronting competition is to identify difficult-to-imitate the firm. In this regard, the work of Ghemawat (1991) is internal and external competences most likely to highly germane to the dynamic capabilities approach to support valuable products and services. Thus, as strategy. 20 See, for example, Iansiti and Clark (1994) and Henderson argued by Dierickx and Cool (1989) , choices (1994). about how much to spend (invest) on different 21 See , Prahalad and Hamel (1990) , possible areas are central to the firm's strategy. Dierickx and Cool (1989) , Chandler (1990) , and Teece (1993).
However, choices about domains of competence to which a core competence is distinctive depends Factors of production on how well endowed the firm is relative to its competitors, and on how difficult it is for comThese are 'undifferentiated' inputs available in disaggregate form in factor markets. By undiffer-petitors to replicate its competences. entiated we mean that they lack a firm-specific component. Land, unskilled labor, and capital are Dynamic capabilities typical examples. Some factors may be available for the taking, such as public knowledge. In the We define dynamic capabilities as the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal language of Arrow, such resources must be 'nonfugitive.'
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Property rights are usually well and external competences to address rapidly changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus defined for factors of production.
reflect an organization's ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive advantage Resources 23 given path dependencies and market positions (Leonard-Barton, 1992) . Resources are firm-specific assets that are difficult if not impossible to imitate. Trade secrets and certain specialized production facilities and engi-Products neering experience are examples. Such assets are difficult to transfer among firms because of trans-End products are the final goods and services produced by the firm based on utilizing the comactions costs and transfer costs, and because the assets may contain tacit knowledge.
petences that it possesses. The performance (price, quality, etc.) of a firm's products relative to its competitors at any point in time will depend Organizational routines/competences upon its competences (which over time depend on its capabilities). When firm-specific assets are assembled in integrated clusters spanning individuals and groups so that they enable distinctive activities to be Markets and strategic capabilities performed, these activities constitute organizational routines and processes. Examples include Different approaches to strategy view sources of wealth creation and the essence of the strategic quality, miniaturization, and systems integration. Such competences are typically viable across mul-problem faced by firms differently. The competitive forces framework sees the strategic problem tiple product lines, and may extend outside the firm to embrace alliance partners.
in terms of industry structure, entry deterrence, and positioning; game-theoretic models view the strategic problem as one of interaction between Core competences rivals with certain expectations about how each other will behave; 25 resource-based perspectives We define those competences that define a firm's fundamental business as core. Core competences have focused on the exploitation of firm-specific assets. Each approach asks different, often commust accordingly be derived by looking across the range of a firm's (and its competitors) prod-plementary questions. A key step in building a conceptual framework related to dynamic capaucts and services. 24 The value of core competences can be enhanced by combination with bilities is to identify the foundations upon which distinctive and difficult-to-replicate advantages the appropriate complementary assets. The degree can be built, maintained, and enhanced. A useful way to vector in on the strategic 22 Arrow (1996) defines fugitive resources as ones that can move cheaply amongst individuals and firms.
elements of the business enterprise is first to 23 We do not like the term 'resource' and believe it is identify what is not strategic. To be strategic, a misleading. We prefer to use the term firm-specific asset. We use it here to try and maintain links to the literature on the resource-based approach which we believe is important. 24 Thus Eastman Kodak's core competence might be considered imaging, IBM's might be considered integrated data 25 In sequential move games, each player looks ahead and anticipates his rival's future responses in order to reason back processing and service, and Motorola's untethered communications.
and decide action, i.e., look forward, reason backward.
capability must be honed to a user need 26 (so to coordinate activity. 28 The very essence of most capabilities/competences is that they cannot be there is a source of revenues), unique (so that the products/services produced can be priced readily assembled through markets (Teece, 1982 (Teece, , 1986a Zander and Kogut, 1995) . If the ability without too much regard to competition) and difficult to replicate (so profits will not be com-to assemble competences using markets is what is meant by the firm as a nexus of contracts peted away). Accordingly, any assets or entity which are homogeneous and can be bought and (Fama, 1980), then we unequivocally state that the firm about which we theorize cannot be usesold at an established price cannot be all that strategic (Barney, 1986 ). What is it, then, about fully modeled as a nexus of contracts. By 'contract' we are referring to a transaction undergirded firms which undergirds competitive advantage?
To answer this, one must first make some by a legal agreement, or some other arrangement which clearly spells out rights, rewards, and fundamental distinctions between markets and internal organization (firms). The essence of the responsibilities. Moreover, the firm as a nexus of contracts suggests a series of bilateral contracts firm, as Coase (1937) pointed out, is that it displaces market organization. It does so in the orchestrated by a coordinator. Our view of the firm is that the organization takes place in a more main because inside the firms one can organize certain types of economic activity in ways one multilateral fashion, with patterns of behavior and learning being orchestrated in a much more cannot using markets. This is not only because of transaction costs, as Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 decentralized fashion, but with a viable headquarters operation. emphasized, but also because there are many types of arrangements where injecting high-pow-
The key point, however, is that the properties of internal organization cannot be replicated by ered (market like) incentives might well be quite destructive of cooperative activity and learning. 27 a portfolio of business units amalgamated just through formal contracts as many distinctive Inside an organization, exchange cannot take place in the same manner that it can outside an elements of internal organization simply cannot be replicated in the market. 29 That is, entrepreorganization, not just because it might be destructive to provide high-powered individual incen-neurial activity cannot lead to the immediate replication of unique organizational skills through tives, but because it is difficult if not impossible to tightly calibrate individual contribution to a simply entering a market and piecing the parts together overnight. Replication takes time, and joint effort. Hence, contrary to Arrow's (1969) view of firms as quasi markets, and the task the replication of best practice may be illusive.
Indeed, firm capabilities need to be understood of management to inject markets into firms, we recognize the inherent limits and possible counter-not in terms of balance sheet items, but mainly in terms of the organizational structures and productive results of attempting to fashion firms into simply clusters of internal markets. In parti-managerial processes which support productive activity. By construction, the firm's balance sheet cular, learning and internal technology transfer may well be jeopardized.
contains items that can be valued, at least at original market prices (cost). It is necessarily the Indeed, what is distinctive about firms is that they are domains for organizing activity in a case, therefore, that the balance sheet is a poor shadow of a firm's distinctive competences.
30 nonmarket-like fashion. Accordingly, as we discuss what is distinctive about firms, we stress competences/capabilities which are ways of 28 We see the problem of market contracting as a matter of coordination as much as we see it a problem of opportunism organizing and getting things done which cannot in the fact of contractual hazards. In this sense, we are be accomplished merely by using the price system consonant with both Richardson (1960) and Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 . 29 As we note in Teece et al. (1994) , the conglomerate offers few if any efficiencies because there is little provided by 26 Needless to say, users need not be the current customers of the enterprise. Thus a capability can be the basis for the conglomerate form that shareholders cannot obtain for themselves simply by holding a diversified portfolio of stocks. diversification into new product markets. 27 Indeed, the essence of internal organization is that it is a 30 Owners' equity may reflect, in part, certain historic capabilities. Recently, some scholars have begun to attempt to measdomain of unleveraged or low-powered incentives. By unleveraged we mean that rewards are determined at the group or ure organizational capability using financial statement data.
See Baldwin and Clark (1991) and Lev and Sougiannis organization level, not primarily at the individual level, in an effort to encourage team behavior, not individual behavior.
That which is distinctive cannot be bought and focuses on replication and imitation, as it is these phenomena which determine how readily a comsold short of buying the firm itself, or one or more of its subunits.
petence or capability can be cloned by competitors, and therefore distinctiveness of its comThere are many dimensions of the business firm that must be understood if one is to grasp petences and the durability of its advantage.
The firm's processes and positions collectively firm-level distinctive competences/capabilities. In this paper we merely identify several classes of encompass its competences and capabilities. A hierarchy of competences/capabilities ought to be factors that will help determine a firm's distinctive competence and dynamic capabilities. We recognized, as some competences may be on the factory floor, some in the R&D labs, some in the organize these in three categories: processes, positions, and paths. The essence of competences executive suites, and some in the way everything is integrated. A difficult-to-replicate or difficultand capabilities is embedded in organizational processes of one kind or another. But the content to-imitate competence was defined earlier as a distinctive competence. As indicated, the key feaof these processes and the opportunities they afford for developing competitive advantage at ture of distinctive competence is that there is not a market for it, except possibly through the marany point in time are shaped significantly by the assets the firm possesses (internal and market) ket for business units. Hence competences and capabilities are intriguing assets as they typically and by the evolutionary path it has adopted/inherited. Hence organizational processes, must be built because they cannot be bought. shaped by the firm's asset positions and molded by its evolutionary and co-evolutionary paths, Organizational and managerial processes explain the essence of the firm's dynamic capabilities and its competitive advantage.
Organizational processes have three roles: coordination/integration (a static concept); learning (a dynamic concept); and reconfiguration (a Processes, positions, and paths transformational concept). We discuss each in turn. We thus advance the argument that the competitive advantage of firms lies with its managerial and organizational processes, shaped by its Coordination/integration. While the price system supposedly coordinates the economy, 32 man-(specific) asset position, and the paths available to it.
31 By managerial and organizational proc-agers coordinate or integrate activity inside the firm. How efficiently and effectively internal esses, we refer to the way things are done in the firm, or what might be referred to as its routines, coordination or integration is achieved is very important (Aoki, 1990) . 33 Likewise for external or patterns of current practice and learning. By position we refer to its current specific endow-coordination. 34 Increasingly, strategic advantage requires the integration of external activities and ments of technology, intellectual property, complementary assets, customer base, and its external technologies. The growing literature on strategic relations with suppliers and complementors. By paths we refer to the strategic alternatives avail- 32 The coordinative properties of markets depend on prices able to the firm, and the presence or absence of being "sufficient" upon which to base resource allocation increasing returns and attendant path dependecisions.
dencies. 33 Indeed, Ronald Coase, author of the pathbreaking 1937 article 'The nature of the firm,' which focused on the costs Our focus throughout is on asset structures for of organizational coordination inside the firm as compared to which no ready market exists, as these are the across the market, half a century later has identified as critical only assets of strategic interest. A final section the understanding of 'why the costs of organizing particular activities differs among firms' (Coase, 1988: 47) . We argue that a firm's distinctive ability needs to be understood as a reflection of distinctive organizational or coordinative capabili- 31 We are implicitly saying that fixed assets, like plant and equipment which can be purchased off-the-shelf by all industry ties. This form of integration (i.e., inside business units) is different from the integration between business units; they participants, cannot be the source of a firm's competitive advantage. In asmuch as financial balance sheets typically could be viable on a stand-alone basis (external integration).
For a useful taxonomy, see Iansiti and Clark (1994) . reflect such assets, we point out that the assets that matter for competitive advantage are rarely reflected in the balance 34 Shuen (1994) examines the gains and hazards of the technology make-vs.-buy decision and supplier codevelopment. sheet, while those that do not are. alliances, the virtual corporation, and buyer-gest that productive systems display high interdependency, and that it may not be possible to supplier relations and technology collaboration evidences the importance of external integration change one level without changing others. This appears to be true with respect to the 'lean and sourcing.
There is some field-based empirical research production' model (Womack et al., 1991) which has now transformed the Taylor or Ford model that provides support for the notion that the way production is organized by management inside of manufacturing organization in the automobile industry. 36 Lean production requires distinctive the firm is the source of differences in firms' competence in various domains. For example, shop floor practices and processes as well as distinctive higher-order managerial processes. Put Garvin's (1988) study of 18 room air-conditioning plants reveals that quality performance was differently, organizational processes often display high levels of coherence, and when they do, not related to either capital investment or the degree of automation of the facilities. Instead, replication may be difficult because it requires systemic changes throughout the organization and quality performance was driven by special organizational routines. These included routines for also among interorganizational linkages, which might be very hard to effectuate. Put differently, gathering and processing information, for linking customer experiences with engineering design partial imitation or replication of a successful model may yield zero benefits.
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choices, and for coordinating factories and component suppliers. 35 The work of Clark and Fujimoto (1991) on project development in the 36 Fujimoto (1994: 18-20) describes key elements as they automobile industry also illustrates the role played existed in the Japanese auto industry as follows: 'The typical volume production system of effective Japanese makers of by coordinative routines. Their study reveals a The elements of such a system include inventory reduction ties seem to have a significant impact on such mechanisms by Kanban system; levelization of production volume and product mix (heijunka); reduction of 'muda' performance variables as development cost, devel-(non-value adding activities), 'mura' (uneven pace of opment lead times, and quality. Furthermore, production) and muri (excessive workload); production plans Clark and Fujimoto tended to find significant based on dealers' order volume (genyo seisan); reduction of die set-up time and lot size in stamping operation; mixed firm-level differences in coordination routines and model assembly; piece-by-piece transfer of parts between these differences seemed to have persisted for a machines (ikko-nagashi); flexible task assignment for volume long time. This suggests that routines related to changes and productivity improvement (shojinka); multi-task job assignment along the process flow (takotei-mochi); Ucoordination are firm-specific in nature.
shape machine layout that facilitates flexible and multiple Also, the notion that competence/capability is task assignment, on-the-spot inspection by direct workers embedded in distinct ways of coordinating and (tsukurikomi); fool-proof prevention of defects (poka-yoke); real-time feedback of production troubles (andon); assembly combining helps to explain how and why seemline stop cord; emphasis on cleanliness, order and discipline ingly minor technological changes can have on the shop floor (5-S); frequent revision of standard operating devastating impacts on incumbent firms' abilities procedures by supervisors; quality control circles; standardized tools for quality improvement (e.g., 7 tools for QC, QC to compete in a market. Henderson and Clark story); worker involvement in preventive maintenance (Total (1990), for example, have shown that inProductive Maintenance); low cost automation or semi-autocumbments in the photolithographic equipment mation with just-enough functions ); reduction of process steps for saving of tools and dies, and so on. The human-resource industry were sequentially devasted by seemingly management factors that back up the above elements include minor innovations that, nevertheless, had major stable employment of core workers (with temporary workers impacts on how systems had to be configured. in the periphery); long-term training of multi-skilled (multitask) workers; wage system based in part on skill accumuThey attribute these difficulties to the fact that lation; internal promotion to shop floor supervisors; cooperasystems-level or 'architectural' innovations often tive relationships with labor unions; inclusion of production require new routines to integrate and coordinate supervisors in union members; generally egalitarian policies for corporate welfare, communication and worker motivation. engineering tasks. These findings and others sugParts procurement policies are also pointed out often as a source of the competitive advantage. 37 For a theoretical argument along these lines, see Milgrom 35 Garvin ( 1994 ) provides a typology of organizational processes.
and Roberts (1990) .
The notion that there is a certain rationality or which repetition and experimentation enable tasks to be performed better and quicker. It also enables coherence to processes and systems is not quite the same concept as corporate culture, as we new production opportunities to be identified. 39 In the context of the firm, if not more generally, understand the latter. Corporate culture refers to the values and beliefs that employees hold; cul-learning has several key characteristics. First, learning involves organizational as well as inditure can be a de facto governance system as it mediates the behavior of individuals and econo-vidual skills. 40 While individual skills are of relevance, their value depends upon their employmizes on more formal administrative methods. Rationality or coherence notions are more akin ment, in particular organizational settings.
Learning processes are intrinsically social and to the Nelson and Winter (1982) notion of organizational routines. However, the routines concept collective and occur not only through the imitation and emulation of individuals, as with is a little too amorphous to properly capture the congruence amongst processes and between teacher-student or master-apprentice, but also because of joint contributions to the understandprocesses and incentives that we have in mind. Consider a professional service organization like ing of complex problems. 41 Learning requires common codes of communication and coordinated an accounting firm. If it is to have relatively high-powered incentives that reward individual search procedures. Second, the organizational knowledge generated by such activity resides in performance, then it must build organizational processes that channel individual behavior; if it new patterns of activity, in 'routines,' or a new logic of organization. As indicated earlier, rouhas weak or low-powered incentives, it must find symbolic ways to recognize the high performers, tines are patterns of interactions that represent successful solutions to particular problems. These and it must use alternative methods to build effort and enthusiasm. What one may think of as styles patterns of interaction are resident in group behavior, though certain subroutines may be resiof organization in fact contain necessary, not discretionary, elements to achieve performance. dent in individual behavior. The concept of dynamic capabilities as a coordinative manageRecognizing the congruences and complementarities among processes, and between processes ment process opens the door to the potential for interorganizational learning. Researchers (Doz and incentives, is critical to the understanding of organizational capabilities. In particular, they can and Shuen, 1990; Mody, 1993) have pointed out that collaborations and partnerships can be a help us explain why architectural and radical innovations are so often introduced into an indus-vehicle for new organizational learning, helping firms to recognize dysfunctional routines, and try by new entrants. The incumbents develop distinctive organizational processes that cannot preventing strategic blindspots. support the new technology, despite certain overt similarities between the old and the new. The Reconfiguration and transformation. In rapidly changing environments, there is obviously value frequent failure of incumbents to introduce new technologies can thus be seen as a consequence in the ability to sense the need to reconfigure the firm's asset structure, and to accomplish the of the mismatch that so often exists between the set of organizational processes needed to support necessary internal and external transformation (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Langlois, 1994) . the conventional product/service and the requirements of the new. Radical organizational re-This requires constant surveillance of markets and technologies and the willingness to adopt best engineering will usually be required to support the new product, which may well do better practice. In this regard, benchmarking is of conembedded in a separate subsidiary where a new set of coherent organizatonal processes can be 39 For a useful review and contribution, see Levitt and March (1988). fashioned. 38 40 March, 1993. Mahoney (1992) and Mahoney and Pandian (1995) suggest that both resources and mental Learning. Perhaps even more important than models are intertwined in firm-level learning. 41 There is a large literature on learning, although only a integration is learning. Learning is a process by small fraction of it deals with organizational learning. Relevant contributors include Levitt and March (1988) , Argyris and Schon (1978) , Levinthal and March (1981) , Nelson and Winter (1982) , and Leonard-Barton (1995) . 38 See Abernathy and Clark (1985) . siderable value as an organized process for Prior commercialization activities require and enable firms to build such complementarities accomplishing such ends (Camp, 1989) . In dynamic environments, narcissistic organizations (Teece, 1986b) . Such capabilities and assets, while necessary for the firm's established activiare likely to be impaired. The capacity to reconfigure and transform is itself a learned organiza-ties, may have other uses as well. These assets typically lie downstream. New products and proctional skill. The more frequently practiced, the easier accomplished. esses either can enhance or destroy the value of such assets (Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli, Change is costly and so firms must develop processes to minimize low pay-off change. The 1986). Thus the development of computers enhanced the value of IBM's direct sales force ability to calibrate the requirements for change and to effectuate the necessary adjustments would in office products, while disk brakes rendered useless much of the auto industry's investment appear to depend on the ability to scan the environment, to evaluate markets and competitors, in drum brakes. and to quickly accomplish reconfiguration and transformation ahead of competition. Decentrali-Financial assets. In the short run, a firm's cash position and degree of leverage may have strazation and local autonomy assist these processes. Firms that have honed these capabilities are tegic implications. While there is nothing more fungible than cash, it cannot always be raised sometimes referred to as 'high-flex'.
from external markets without the dissemination of considerable information to potential investors.
Positions
Accordingly, what a firm can do in short order is often a function of its balance sheet. In the The strategic posture of a firm is determined not only by its learning processes and by the coher-longer run, that ought not be so, as cash flow ought be more determinative. ence of its internal and external processes and incentives, but also by its specific assets. By specific assets we mean for example its special-Reputational assets. Firms, like individuals, have reputations. Reputations often summarize a ized plant and equipment. These include its difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and assets good deal of information about firms and shape the responses of customers, suppliers, and comcomplementary to them, as well as its reputational and relational assets. Such assets determine its petitors. It is sometimes difficult to disentangle reputation from the firm's current asset and marcompetitive advantage at any point in time. We identify several illustrative classes. ket position. However, in our view, reputational assets are best viewed as an intangible asset that enables firms to achieve various goals in the Technological assets. While there is an emerging market for know-how (Teece, 1981) , much market. Its main value is external, since what is critical about reputation is that it is a kind of technology does not enter it. This is either because the firm is unwilling to sell it 42 or summary statistic about the firm's current assets and position, and its likely future behavior. because of difficulties in transacting in the market for know-how (Teece, 1980 Structural assets. The formal and informal structure of organizations and their external linkComplementary assets. Technological innovations require the use of certain related assets ages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation, and how competences to produce and deliver new products and services.
and capabilities co-evolve (Argyres, 1995; Teece, 1996) . The degree of hierarchy and the level of firm-specific structure. Distinctive governance Organizational boundaries. An important dimension of 'position' is the location of a firm's modes can be recognized (e.g., multiproduct, integrated firms; high 'flex' firms; virtual corpora-boundaries. Put differently, the degree of integration (vertical, lateral, and horizontal) is of tions; conglomerates), and these modes support different types of innovation to a greater or lesser quite some significance. Boundaries are not only significant with respect to the technological and degree. For instance, virtual structures work well when innovation is autonomous; integrated struc-complementary assets contained within, but also with respect to the nature of the coordination that tures work better for systemic innovations.
can be achieved internally as compared to through markets. When specific assets or poorly protected Institutional assets. Environments cannot be defined in terms of markets alone. While public intellectual capital are at issue, pure market arrangements expose the parties to recontracting policies are usually recognized as important in constraining what firms can do, there is a ten-hazards or appropriability hazards. In such circumstances, hierarchical control structures may dency, particularly by economists, to see these as acting through markets or through incentives. work better than pure arms-length contracts. 44 However, institutions themselves are a critical element of the business environment. Regulatory Paths systems, as well as intellectual property regimes, tort laws, and antitrust laws, are also part of the environment. So is the system of higher education Path dependencies. Where a firm can go is a function of its current position and the paths and national culture. There are significant national differences here, which is just one of the reasons ahead. Its current position is often shaped by the path it has traveled. In standard economics geographic location matters (Nelson, 1994) . Such assets may not be entirely firm specific; firms of textbooks, firms have an infinite range of technologies from which they can choose and markets different national and regional origin may have quite different institutional assets to call upon they can occupy. Changes in product or factor prices will be responded to instantaneously, with because their institutional/policy settings are so different.
technologies moving in and out according to value maximization criteria. Only in the short run are irreversibilities recognized. Fixed costs-such Market (structure) assets. Product market position matters, but it is often not at all determina-as equipment and overheads-cause firms to price below fully amortized costs but never constrain tive of the fundamental position of the enterprise in its external environment. Part of the problem future investment choices. 'Bygones are bygones. ' Path dependencies are simply not recognized. lies in defining the market in which a firm competes in a way that gives economic meaning. This is a major limitation of microeconomic theory. More importantly, market position in regimes of rapid technological change is often extremely
The notion of path dependencies recognizes that 'history matters.' Bygones are rarely fragile. This is in part because time moves on a different clock in such environments. 43 Moreover, bygones, despite the predictions of rational actor theory. Thus a firm's previous investments and the link between market share and innovation has long been broken, if it ever existed (Teece, 1996) . All of this is to suggest that product market 44 Williamson (1996: 102-103) has observed, failures of coorposition, while important, is too often overplayed. dination may arise because 'parties that bear a long term Strategy should be formulated with regard to the bilateral dependency relationship to one another must recogmore fundamental aspects of firm performance, nize that incomplete contracts require gap filling and sometimes get out of alignment. Although it is always in the which we believe are rooted in competences and collective interest of autonomous parties to fill gaps, correct capabilities and shaped by positions and paths.
errors, and affect efficient realignments, it is also the case that the distribution of the resulting gains is indeterminate. Self-interested bargaining predictably obtains. Such bargaining is itself costly. The main costs, however, are that transactions 43 For instance, an Internet year might well be thought of as equivalent to 10 years on many industry clocks, because as are maladapted to the environment during the bargaining interval. Also, the prospect of ex post bargaining invites ex much change occurs in the Internet business in a year that occurs in say the auto industry in a decade.
ante prepositioning of an inefficient kind.' its repertoire of routines (its 'history') constrain gically through technology-sponsoring activities.
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The first type of competition is not unlike biologiits future behavior. 45 This follows because learning tends to be local. That is, opportunities for cal competition amongst species, although it can be sharpened by managerial activities that learning will be 'close in' to previous activities and thus will be transaction and production spe-enhance the performance of products and processes. The reality is that companies with the best cific (Teece, 1988) . This is because learning is often a process of trial, feedback, and evaluation. products will not always win, as chance events may cause 'lock-in' on inferior technologies If too many parameters are changed simultaneously, the ability of firms to conduct mean- (Arthur, 1983) and may even in special cases generate switching costs for consumers. However, ingful natural quasi experiments is attenuated. If many aspects of a firm's learning environment while switching costs may favor the incumbent, in regimes of rapid technological change switchchange simultaneously, the ability to ascertain cause-effect relationships is confounded because ing costs can become quickly swamped by switching benefits. Put differently, new products cognitive structures will not be formed and rates of learning diminish as a result. One implication employing different standards often appear with alacrity in market environments experiencing is that many investments are much longer term than is commonly thought.
rapid technological change, and incumbents can be readily challenged by superior products and The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing returns to services that yield switching benefits. Thus the degree to which switching costs cause 'lock-in' adoption exist. This is a demand-side phenomenon, and it tends to make technologies and is a function of factors such as user learning, rapidity of technological change, and the amount products embodying those technologies more attractive the more they are adopted. Attractive-of ferment in the competitive environment. ness flows from the greater adoption of the product amongst users, which in turn enables them to Technological opportunities. The concept of path dependencies is given forward meaning become more developed and hence more useful. Increasing returns to adoption has many sources through the consideration of an industry's technological opportunities. It is well recognized that including network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) , the presence of complementary assets how far and how fast a particular area of industrial activity can proceed is in part due to the (Teece, 1986b) and supporting infrastructure (Nelson, 1996) , learning by using (Rosenberg, technological opportunities that lie before it. Such opportunities are usually a lagged function of 1982), and scale economies in production and distribution. Competition between and amongst foment and diversity in basic science, and the rapidity with which new scientific breakthroughs technologies is shaped by increasing returns. Early leads won by good luck or special circum-are being made.
However, technological opportunities may not stances (Arthur, 1983) can become amplified by increasing returns. This is not to suggest that be completely exogenous to industry, not only because some firms have the capacity to engage first movers necessarily win. Because increasing returns have multiple sources, the prior posi-in or at least support basic research, but also because technological opportunities are often fed tioning of firms can affect their capacity to exploit increasing returns. Thus, in Mitchell's (1989) by innovative activity itself. Moreover, the recognition of such opportunities is affected by the study of medical diagnostic imaging, firms already controlling the relevant complementary assets could in theory start last and finish first. 46 Because of huge uncertainties, it may be extremely difficult
In the presence of increasing returns, firms can to determine viable strategies early on. Since the rules of the game and the identity of the players will be revealed only compete passively, or they may compete strateafter the market has begun to evolve, the pay-off is likely to lie with building and maintaining organizational capabilities that support flexibility. For example, Microsoft's recent aboutface and vigorous pursuit of Internet business once the NetScape phenomenon became apparent is impressive, not so much because it perceived the need to change strategy, but because of its organizational capacity to effectuate a stra-45 For further development, see Bercovitz, de Figueiredo, and Teece, 1996. tegic shift.
organizational structures that link the institutions approaches to the firm and to strategy. 49 Moreover, the agency theoretic view of the firm as a engaging in basic research (primarily the university) to the business enterprise. Hence, the nexus of contracts would put no weight on processes, positions, and paths. While agency existence of technological opportunities can be quite firm specific.
approaches to the firm may recognize that opportunism and shirking may limit what a firm can Important for our purposes is the rate and direction in which relevant scientific frontiers are do, they do not recognize the opportunities and constraints imposed by processes, positions, and being rolled back. Firms engaging in R&D may find the path dead ahead closed off, though break-paths.
Moreover, the firm in our conceptualization is throughs in related areas may be sufficiently close to be attractive. Likewise, if the path dead ahead much more than the sum of its parts-or a team tied together by contracts. 50 Indeed, to some is extremely attractive, there may be no incentive for firms to shift the allocation of resources away extent individuals can be moved in and out of organizations and, so long as the internal procfrom traditional pursuits. The depth and width of technological opportunities in the neighborhood esses and structures remain in place, performance will not necessarily be impaired. A shift in the of a firm's prior research activities thus are likely to impact a firm's options with respect to both environment is a far more serious threat to the firm than is the loss of key individuals, as individthe amount and level of R&D activity that it can justify. In addition, a firm's past experience uals can be replaced more readily than organizations can be transformed. Furthermore, the conditions the alternatives management is able to perceive. Thus, not only do firms in the same dynamic capabilities view of the firm would suggest that the behavior and performance of partiindustry face 'menus' with different costs associated with particular technological choices, they cular firms may be quite hard to replicate, even if its coherence and rationality are observable. also are looking at menus containing different choices.
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This matter and related issues involving replication and imitation are taken up in the section that follows. Assessment
The essence of a firm's competence and dynamic Replicability and imitatability of capabilities is presented here as being resident in organizational processes and positions the firm's organizational processes, that are in turn shaped by the firm's assets (positions) and its Thus far, we have argued that the competences and capabilities (and hence competitive advantage) evolutionary path. Its evolutionary path, despite managerial hubris that might suggest otherwise, of a firm rest fundamentally on processes, shaped by positions and paths. However, competences is often rather narrow. 48 What the firm can do and where it can go are thus rather constrained can provide competitive advantage and generate rents only if they are based on a collection of by its positions and paths. Its competitors are likewise constrained. Rents (profits) thus tend to routines, skills, and complementary assets that are difficult to imitate. 51 A particular set of routines flow not just from the asset structure of the firm and, as we shall see, the degree of its imitability, can lose their value if they support a competence which no longer matters in the marketplace, or but also by the firm's ability to reconfigure and transform.
if they can be readily replicated or emulated by competitors. Imitation occurs when firms discover The parameters we have identified for determining performance are quite different from and simply copy a firm's organizational routines and procedures. Emulation occurs when firms those in the standard textbook theory of the firm, and in the competitive forces and strategic conflict 49 In both the firm is still largely a black box. Certainly, little or no attention is given to processes, positions, and paths. 47 This is a critical element in Nelson and Winter's (1982) view of firms and technical change. 50 See Alchian and Demsetz (1972) . 51 We call such competences distinctive. See also Dierickx 48 We also recognize that the processes, positions, and paths of customers also matter. See our discussion above on increasing and Cool (1989) for a discussion of the characteristics of assets which make them a source of rents. returns, including customer learning and network externalities. discover alternative ways of achieving the same Some routines and competences seem to be attributable to local or regional forces that shape functionality. 52 firms' capabilities at early stages in their lives. Porter (1990) , for example, shows that differences Replication in local product markets, local factor markets, and institutions play an important role in shaping To understand imitation, one must first understand replication. Replication involves transferring or competitive capabilities. Differences also exist within populations of firms from the same counredeploying competences from one concrete economic setting to another. Since productive knowl-try. Various studies of the automobile industry, for example, show that not all Japanese autoedge is embodied, this cannot be accomplished by simply transmitting information. Only in those mobile companies are top performers in terms of quality, productivity, or product development instances where all relevant knowledge is fully codified and understood can replication be col-(see, for example, Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) .
The role of firm-specific history has been highlapsed into a simple problem of information transfer. Too often, the contextual dependence of ori-lighted as a critical factor explaining such firmlevel (as opposed to regional or national-level) ginal performance is poorly appreciated, so unless firms have replicated their systems of productive differences (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Replication in a different context may thus be rather knowledge on many prior occasions, the act of replication is likely to be difficult (Teece, 1976) . difficult.
At least two types of strategic value flow Indeed, replication and transfer are often impossible absent the transfer of people, though this from replication. One is the ability to support geographic and product line expansion. To the can be minimized if investments are made to convert tacit knowledge to codified knowledge. extent that the capabilities in question are relevant to customer needs elsewhere, replication Often, however, this is simply not possible.
In short, competences and capabilities, and the can confer value. 55 Another is that the ability to replicate also indicates that the firm has the routines upon which they rest, are normally rather difficult to replicate. 53 Even understanding what foundations in place for learning and improvement. Considerable empirical evidence supports all the relevant routines are that support a particular competence may not be transparent. Indeed, the notion that the understanding of processes, both in production and in management, is the Lippman and Rumelt (1992) have argued that some sources of competitive advantage are so key to process improvement. In short, an organization cannot improve that which it does complex that the firm itself, let alone its competitors, does not understand them.
54 As Nelson and not understand. Deep process understanding is often required to accomplish codification. Winter (1982) and Teece (1982) have explained, many organizational routines are quite tacit in Indeed, if knowledge is highly tacit, it indicates that underlying structures are not well undernature. Imitation can also be hindered by the fact few routines are 'stand-alone;' coherence may stood, which limits learning because scientific and engineering principles cannot be as systemrequire that a change in one set of routines in one part of the firm (e.g., production) requires atically applied.
56 Instead, learning is confined to proceeding through trial and error, and the changes in some other part (e.g., R&D). 55 Needless to say, there are many examples of firms rep-52 There is ample evidence that a given type of competence (e.g., quality) can be supported by different routines and licating their capabilities inappropriately by applying extant routines to circumstances where they may not be applicable, combinations of skills. For example, the Garvin (1988) and Clark and Fujimoto (1991) studies both indicate that there e.g., Nestle's transfer of developed-country marketing methods for infant formula to the Third World (Hartley, 1989) . A key was no one 'formula' for achieving either high quality or high product development performance. strategic need is for firms to screen capabilities for their applicability to new environments. 53 See Szulanski's (1995) discussion of the intrafirm transfer of best practice. He quotes a senior vice president of Xerox 56 Different approaches to learning are required depending on the depth of knowledge. Where knowledge is less articulated as saying 'you can see a high performance factory or office, but it just doesn't spread. I don't know why.' Szulanski also and structured, trial and error and learning-by-doing are necessary, whereas in mature environments where the underlydiscusses the role of benchmarking in facilitating the transfer of best practice.
ing engineering science is better understood, organizations can undertake more deductive approaches or what Pisano 54 If so, it is our belief that the firm's advantage is likely to fade, as luck does run out.
(1994) refers to as 'learning-before-doing.' leverage that might otherwise come from the are thus more protectable if there is no need to expose them in contexts where competitors can application of scientific theory is denied.
learn about them. One should not, however, overestimate the Imitation overall importance of intellectual property protection; yet it presents a formidable imitation barrier Imitation is simply replication performed by a competitor. If self-replication is difficult, imitation in certain particular contexts. Intellectual property protection is not uniform across products, procis likely to be harder. In competitive markets, it is the ease of imitation that determines the esses, and technologies, and is best thought of as islands in a sea of open competition. If one is sustainability of competitive advantage. Easy imitation implies the rapid dissipation of rents. not able to place the fruits of one's investment, ingenuity, or creativity on one or more of the Factors that make replication difficult also make imitation difficult. Thus, the more tacit the islands, then one indeed is at sea.
We use the term appropriability regimes to firm's productive knowledge, the harder it is to replicate by the firm itself or its competitors. describe the ease of imitation. Appropriability is a function both of the ease of replication and When the tacit component is high, imitation may well be impossible, absent the hiring away of the efficacy of intellectual property rights as a barrier to imitation. Appropriability is strong key individuals and the transfers of key organization processes.
when a technology is both inherently difficult to replicate and the intellectual property system However, another set of barriers impedes imitation of certain capabilities in advanced industrial provides legal barriers to imitation. When it is inherently easy to replicate and intellectual countries. This is the system of intellectual property rights, such as patents, trade secrets, and property protection is either unavailable or ineffectual, then appropriability is weak. Intermeditrademarks, and even trade dress. 57 Intellectual property protection is of increasing importance in ate conditions also exist. the United States, as since 1982 the legal system has adopted a more pro-patent posture. Similar trends are evident outside the United States. CONCLUSION Besides the patent system, several other factors cause there to be a difference between replication The four paradigms discussed above are quite different, though the first two have much in costs and imitation costs. The observability of the technology or the organization is one such common with each other (strategizing) as do the last two (economizing). But are these paradigms important factor. Whereas vistas into product technology can be obtained through strategies complementary or competitive? According to some authors, 'the resource perspective comsuch as reverse engineering, this is not the case for process technology, as a firm need not expose plements the industry analysis framework ' (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993: 35) . While this is its process technology to the outside in order to benefit from it. 58 Firms with product technology, undoubtedly true, we think that in several important respects the perspectives are also comon the other hand, confront the unfortunate circumstances that they must expose what they have petitive. While this should be recognized, it is not to suggest that there is only one framework got in order to profit from the technology. Secrets that has value. Indeed, complex problems are likely to benefit from insights obtained from all 57 Trade dress refers to the 'look and feel' of a retail establish-of the paradigms we have identified plus more. ment, e.g., the distinctive marketing and presentation style of The trick is to work out which frameworks are The Nature Company. 58 An interesting but important exception to this can be found appropriate for the problem at hand. Slavish in second sourcing. In the microprocessor business, until the adherence to one class to the neglect of all introduction of the 386 chip, Intel and most other merchant others is likely to generate strategic blindspots. semi producers were encouraged by large customers like IBM to provide second sources, i.e., to license and share their The tools themselves then generate strategic proprietary process technology with competitors like AMD vulnerability. We now explore these issues and NEC. The microprocessor developers did so to assure further. Table 1 summarizes some similarities customers that they had sufficient manufacturing capability to meet demand at all times. and differences. Dierickx and Cool (1989) Porter (1990) in special circumstances, too much 'strategizing' Efficiency vs. market power can lead firms to underinvest in core competences and neglect dynamic capabilities, and thus harm The competitive forces and strategic conflict approaches generally see profits as stemming long-term competitiveness. from strategizing-that is, from limitations on competition which firms achieve through raising Normative implications rivals' costs and exclusionary behavior . The competitive forces approach in The field of strategic management is avowedly normative. It seeks to guide those aspects of particular leads one to see concentrated industries as being attractive-market positions can be general management that have material effects on the survival and success of the business entershielded behind entry barriers, and rivals costs can be raised. It also suggests that the sources prise. Unless these various approaches differ in terms of the framework and heuristics they offer of competitive advantage lie at the level of the industry, or possibly groups within an industry. management, then the discourse we have gone through is of limited immediate value. In this In text book presentations, there is almost no attention at all devoted to discovering, creating, paper, we have already alluded to the fact that the capabilities approach tends to steer managers and commercializing new sources of value.
The dynamic capabilities and resources toward creating distinctive and difficult-to-imitate advantages and avoiding games with customers approaches clearly have a different orientation. They see competitive advantage stemming from and competitors. We now survey possible differences, recognizing that the paradigms are still in high-performance routines operating 'inside the firm,' shaped by processes and positions. Path their infancy and cannot confidently support strong normative conclusions. dependencies (including increasing returns) and technological opportunities mark the road ahead. Because of imperfect factor markets, or more Unit of analysis and analytic focus precisely the nontradability of 'soft' assets like values, culture, and organizational experience, Because in the capabilities and the resources framework business opportunities flow from a distinctive competences and capabilities generally cannot be acquired; they must be built. This firm's unique processes, strategy analysis must be situational. 61 This is also true with the strategic sometimes takes years-possibly decades. In some cases, as when the competence is protected conflict approach. There is no algorithm for creating wealth for the entire industry. Prescripby patents, replication by a competitor is ineffectual as a means to access the technology. The tions they apply to industries or groups of firms at best suggest overall direction, and may indicate capabilities approach accordingly sees definite limits on strategic options, at least in the short errors to be avoided. In contrast, the competitive forces approach is not particularly firm specific; run. Competitive success occurs in part because of policies pursued and experience and efficiency it is industry and group specific. obtained in earlier periods.
Competitive success can undoubtedly flow Strategic change from both strategizing and economizing, 59 but along with Williamson (1991) we believe that The competitive forces and the strategic conflict approach, since they pay little attention to skills, 'economizing is more fundamental than strategizing . . . . or put differently, that economy is the know-how, and path dependency, tend to see best strategy.' 60 Indeed, we suggest that, except
Williamson's as it embraces more than efficient contract 59 Phillips (1971) and Demsetz (1974) also made the case that market concentration resulted from the competitive success design and the minimization of transactions costs. We also address production and organizational economies, and the of more efficient firms, and not from entry barriers and restrictive practices.
distinctive ways that things are accomplished inside the business enterprise. 60 We concur with Williamson that economizing and strategizing are not mutually exclusive. Strategic ploys can be used 61 On this point, the strategic conflict and the resources and capabilities are congruent. However, the aspects of 'situation' to disguise inefficiencies and to promote economizing outcomes, as with pricing with reference to learning curve costs. that matter are dramatically different, as described earlier in this paper. Our view of economizing is perhaps more expansive than strategic choice occurring with relative facility. cal subfield in its industry, following a technological discontinuity. Additionally, the interaction The capabiliies approach sees value augmenting strategic change as being difficult and costly. between specialized assets such as firm-specific capabilities and rivalry had the greatest influence Moreover, it can generally only occur incrementally. Capabilities cannot easily be bought; they on entry timing. must be built. From the capabilities perspective, strategy involves choosing among and committing Diversification to long-term paths or trajectories of competence development.
Related diversification-that is, diversification that builds upon or extends existing capabilities-is In this regard, we speculate that the dominance of competitive forces and the strategic conflict about the only form of diversification that a resources/capabilities framework is likely to view approaches in the United States may have something to do with observed differences in strategic as meritorious (Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1980 Teece, , 1982 Teece et al., 1994) . Such diversification will be approaches adopted by some U.S. and some foreign firms. Hayes (1985) has noted that American justifiable when the firms' traditional markets decline. 62 The strategic conflict approach is likely companies tend to favor 'strategic leaps' while, in contrast, Japanese and German companies tend to be a little more permissive; acquisitions that raise rivals' costs or enable firms to effectuate to favor incremental, but rapid, improvements.
exclusive arrangements are likely to be seen as efficacious in certain circumstances.
Entry strategies
Here the resources and the capabilities approaches Focus and specialization suggest that entry decisions must be made with reference to the competences and capabilities Focus needs to be defined in terms of distinctive competences or capability, not products. Products which new entrants have, relative to the competition. Whereas the other approaches tell you little are the manifestation of competences, as competences can be molded into a variety of products. about where to look to find likely entrants, the capabilities approach identifies likely entrants. Product market specialization and decentalization configured around product markets may cause Relatedly, whereas the entry deterrence approach suggests an unconstrained search for new business firms to neglect the development of core competences and dynamic capabilities, to the extent opportunities, the capabilities approach suggests that such opportunities lie close in to one's exist-to which competences require accessing assets across divisions. ing business. As Richard Rumelt has explained it in conversation, 'the capabilities approach sug-
The capabilities approach places emphasis on the internal processes that a firm utilizes, as well gests that if a firm looks inside itself, and at its market environment, sooner or later it will find as how they are deployed and how they will evolve. The approach has the benefit of indicating a business opportunity.' that competitive advantage is not just a function of how one plays the game; it is also a function Entry timing of the 'assets' one has to play with, and how these assets can be deployed and redeployed in Whereas the strategic conflict approach tells little abut where to look to find likely entrants, the a changing market. resources and the capabilities approach identifies likely entrants and their timing of entry. Brittain and Freeman (1980) using population ecology methodologies argued that an organization is 62 Cantwell shows that the technological competence of firms quick to expand when there is a significant overpersists over time, gradually evolving through firm-specific lap between its core capabilities and those needed learning. He shows that technological diversification has been greater for chemicals and pharmaceuticals than for electrical to survive in a new market. Recent research and electronic-related fields., and he offers as an explanation (Mitchell, 1989) showed that the more industrythe greater straight-ahead opportunities in electrical and elecspecialized assets or capabilities a firm possesses, tronic fields than in chemicals and pharmaceuticals. See Cantwell (1993) . the more likely it is to enter an emerging techni- Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972) . 'Production,
Future directions
information costs, and economic organization ', American Economic Review, 62, We have merely sketched an outline for a Amit, R. and P. Schoemaker (1993) . 'Strategic assets dynamic capabilities approach. Further theoretical and organizational rent', Strategic Management Journal 14(1), pp. 33-46. work is needed to tighten the framework, and Andrews, K. (1987) . The Concept of Corporate empirical research is critical to helping us underStrategy (3rd ed.). Dow Jones-Irwin, Homewood, IL.
stand how firms get to be good, how they some- Aoki, M. (1990) . 'The participatory generation of infortimes stay that way, why and how they improve, mation rents and the theory of the firm'. In M. and why they sometimes decline. 63 
